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
OPERATIONALIZING FIELD MANUAL 25-100 (TRAINING THE
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
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OPERATIONALIZING FIELD MANUAL 25-100
(TRAINING THE FORCE)

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GARY A. JONES

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

OPERATIONALIZING FIELD MANUAL 25-100
(TRAINING THE FORCE)

An Individual Study Project
Intended for Publication

by

Lieutenant Colonel Gary A. Jones

Colonel Edmund J. Glabus, IN
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
2 May 1988

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Gary A. Jones, LTC, IN

TITLE: Operationalizing Field Manual 25-100
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In preparing a battalion to be deployed into a theater of war, the specific items on which training is focused become critical. Too many times in the past battalion commanders have attempted to do everything; thus their units became proficient in nothing. This paper is intended to provide the training approach one battalion commander utilized in order to refine a focus on those critical items necessary to win in war. In brief, how you develop a Mission Essential Task List (METL) within a battalion so soldiers are prepared to face combat and be victorious.

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INTRODUCTION

Day by day you watched the world situation become more and more tense. International politics had become a central point of discussion everywhere you go. You became especially sensitive to changing world affairs as the day you assumed command of a Mechanized Infantry Battalion drew near. How are you going to determine if the battalion is ready for war? If it is, how are you going to insure it stays ready and even more importantly, how do you get the battalion ready to fight if it isn't? What is the standard to go to war to win and win again and again? Take care of the soldier and he will take care of you; develop the Warrior Spirit; train to standard. These thoughts continued to be your focus.

Change of command day finally arrived. As you stood in the reviewing area and watched those magnificent soldiers march by, you were proud to be a part of their battalion. Their old boss had "done good." Enroute to the change of command reception the radio in your car continued to describe deteriorating political situations throughout the world and your thoughts returned to Clausewitz's words in On War. Clausewitz had said: "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means."¹ But by God if we go to war, this battalion is going to take the war to the enemy. Later, as your emotion subsided, you reminded yourself that charges up the middle made for good war stories, but the histories of those charges were often written in the

blood of unnecessary sacrifice.

Upon arriving in the battalion, the series of inbriefings the executive officer had arranged began. You were brought up to date on the status of equipment, personnel, supply and training. Training went last per your request as this area was going to require your greatest attention. Somehow you had to get across to your personnel that training was not a separate issue, rather everything you touched, observed, executed or directed addressed training. During those briefings, you reflected back to the precommand courses and everyone had referred to this new Field Manual 25-100 Training The Force. One of the first topics FM 25-100 addressed was "...focus(ing) on training as the basis for everything a force, unit, or activity is required to do."² The theme of training was everything and everything was training was to become the bedrock of the readiness philosophy of the battalion.

But, how do you get the members of the battalion to understand that training was everything and everything was training. This had to happen if the battalion was expected to be prepared to go to war and win. Throughout the briefing on training, the questions of what direction do we go, and what do you want us to do continued to be paramount. Never once did the briefers state what training was being conducted and why it was necessary. It soon became clear there was a major need for a battle focus for the battalion and its subordinate units. That was specifically what FM 25-100 provided. FM 25-100 described a system that developed a battle focus; insured training conducted

was outcome oriented and held the unit leadership accountable to insure training conducted was to a demanding, realistic standard. FM 25-100 provided for battle focus to be directed initially from the top down. This helped determine the priorities of the battalion and its members. Later, feedback from immediate subordinates to their battalion commander was needed to refine the battle focus process.

Simply stated was what the battalion needed to have developed was a battle focus or as FM 25-100 states a listing of a "series of tasks on which successful accomplishment of the units assigned mission depends." This listing became known as the battalion's Mission Essential Task List (METL).

DEVELOPMENT OF THE BATTALION MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

The battalion began work immediately on developing its METL. This METL was "a prioritized list of combat...tasks derived from the unit's assigned mission considered essential for mission accomplishment...."³ It became the "what" the battalion had to be able to accomplish in order to execute orders received during conflict. After analyzing missions of the battalion as well as the division METL (Figure 1)⁴ and brigade METL (Figure 2)⁵, the battalion leadership had taken the first step in the process of developing its own METL.

DIVISION METL

DEPLOY THE DIVISION IAW CURRENT PLANS

ACHIEVE INTEGRATION OF DIVISION
ROUNDOUT UNITS

CONDUCT OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS

SUSTAIN COMBAT OPERATIONS

FIGURE 1

BRIGADE METL

PREPARE AND EXECUTE AN EMERGENCY
DEPLOYMENT READINESS EXERCISE PLAN

ATTACK

DEFEND

CONDUCT COMBAT SUPPORT MISSIONS

CONDUCT COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MISSIONS


SUPPORT AND TRAIN RESERVE COMPONENT

FIGURE 2

The next step was to conduct an analysis of the brigade and division commanders' intents, missions, contingency plans, the battalion's Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), how to fight manuals, force integration documents and of course the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) for the battalion. This procedure supported the philosophy of battalion commanders must understand their higher commander's intent and

missions. It was critical that in order for a battalion to fight properly the battalion commander must understand how the division commander was going to fight his division. Thus, the battalion's METL reflected the division commander's identification of critical battalion battle tasks he considered necessary for the battalion to master if the division was to win in combat.

By following a procedure that each level of command had identified for itself its METL and briefed back to its higher headquarters, i.e. battalion and brigade commanders briefed to the division commander, the interrelationship of mission, METL and battle tasks helped the division commander identify to his subordinates what he expected of his brigades and battalions. For example "with the restated mission and METL from higher headquarters, subordinate commanders are able to advance their own battle focus processes....Once subordinate leaders have developed their METL, the division level commander reviews and approves them, as required, and also selects from the subordinate METL those tasks which provide the best indication of that unit's ability to support the parent unit's METL and mission. These selected tasks, based on what level of command they come from, became the enabling or battle tasks. From a division perspective, enabling tasks are selected from the brigade level METL with battle tasks coming from the battalion METLs."⁶ (Figure 3)⁷ In quick review, in order to develop a METL the unit's mission, as well as that unit's next higher commander's intent and METL must be considered.



From the final process of analyzing the brigade and battalion missions, division and brigade commander's intent as well as the division and brigade METLs, a battalion METL was developed (Figure 4).

BATTALION METL

ATTACK

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

DEFEND

SUSTAIN

SUPPORT AND TRAIN RESERVE COMPONENT

FIGURE 4

Input from the ARTEP manual was critical to METL development as it provided "a complete program enabling commanders to evaluate and to develop collective training based on unit weaknesses, then train, to overcome those weaknesses and reevaluate."⁸ Once the battalion METL was final and approved by the division commander, then the battalion's focus turned to subordinate unit's METL development.

Company METL development followed basically the same process that the battalion had executed with interface from brigade. From the battalion perspective, company METL represented the battalion enabling tasks and the platoon METL the battalion battle tasks. This procedure was integrated down to Infantry squad, mortar crew, or maintenance section, etc. (Figure 5)⁹.

METL, ENABLING TASK AND BATTLE TASK RELATIONSHIP





FIGURE 5

The integration of METL, Enabling Task and Battle Task Relationships (Figure 5) had become the focus of all training. If a soldier understood why the specific training he conducted that day was necessary and how it tied into the chain of command's METL, the leadership had been successful in teaching a divisional battle focus (Figure 5).

With that battle focus linkage process established the battalion staff, companies, platoons, squads and sections developed their individual METL. For brevity's sake a rifle unit only is discussed in this paper and will not include an Infantry Battalion HHC or E Co. The rifle company METL was very similar to the battalion METL, but differed slightly because not included was the mission essential task (MET) of SUPPORT AND TRAIN THE RESERVE COMPONENT (Figure 6). SUPPORT AND TRAIN THE RESERVE COMPONENT was considered a battalion and not a company requirement to coordinate and/or execute.




Initially some discussion occurred as to why was the MET of HASTY ATTACK not included in the company METL. It was discouraged once you had crosswalked the requirements of HASTY ATTACK and MOVEMENT TO CONTACT in the ARTEP manual you discovered there are tremendous similarities. In fact, the HASTY ATTACK was in the preponderance of cases merely an extension or logical conclusion of a MOVEMENT TO CONTACT. The same type discussion occurred between battalion and brigade as related to the battalion MET for DEFEND. When a detailed crosswalk was conducted of the ARTEP manual as to the requirements of the Battle Position and Sector Defense, tremendous similarities were found to exist. This was further reinforced when it was found, the fundamentals of provide for unit agility, synchronization, initiative to take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses, and insuring depth to the battlefield by maneuver and/or use of terrain became mutually repetitive common factors whether discussing the Battle Position or Sector Defense. Thus, at the battalion level there was not a major difference between the types of defense when the fundamentals of Air Land Battle doctrine were applied.


When the METs of Sector Defense or Battle Position Defense at the company level were considered for METL inclusion there, for all practical considerations, were no differences and only the MET of DEFEND was reflected.

The company leadership next met with its platoon leadership and began the platoon level METL development. Platoon METL (Figure 7) differed slightly from company METL in that the METs

of AMBUSH AND RECON PATROLS were added to the platoon's METL.



Adding the METs of AMBUSH AND RECON PATROLS to the platoon METL and not include the MET of RAID, as described in various Infantry publications, is worthy of discussion. It can be best described as AMBUSH and RECON PATROL METs were considered critical and a RAID MET was important. In addition the PATROL METs had tremendous similar characteristics to the RAID MET; could be used either offensively or defensively; were critical in gaining intelligence on the enemy; and would maintain the offensive spirit even when in a defensive scenario. For an example of how a Battle Task Focus links the AMBUSH MET of a platoon thru to division METL review (Figure 8).



There now existed a direct Battle Task Focus link from platoon to division. A platoon leader could see and understand the "why" he was conducting an AMBUSH PATROL and not just the "what" he was training.

Obviously the process was taught correctly, as within a few weeks squad leaders began briefing their platoon leaders on their squad METL. METL at the squad level became more specific. For instance, the platoon MET of MOVEMENT TO CONTACT was not included as a MET to the squad METL (Figure 9).

SQUAD METL

ATTACK

DEFEND


AMBUSH PATROL

RECON PATROL

SUSTAIN COMBAT READINESS

FIGURE 9

Basis for the elimination of the MOVEMENT TO CONTACT MET, was that at the squad level there was no basic difference in the squad's planning or application between a MOVEMENT TO CONTACT and ATTACK MET. Thus the ATTACK MET remained to maintain an offensive orientation. ARTEP review supported this MET elimination. An example of the METL process that provided the Battle Task Focus linkage from squad thru division for the ATTACK MET is depicted at Figure 10.



The METL, Enabling Task, Battle Task relationship was key and essential in that it tied together Battle Task Focus from all tactical levels to the division. With this procedure, the squad leader and members of the squad had a division Battle Task Focus linkage to training on "why" rather than just "what" they had to accomplish in order to win on the battlefield.

DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL TASK ASSESSMENT

However, this was only a portion of the training issue. The battalion had to also understand the "how do you train to a METL?" Once the unit established a METL then it had to determine how it would evaluate its ability to train to standard to their METL. An excellent base line measurement was against the 7 operating systems that commanders evaluate, allocate and assess the combat potential of their units. Those 7 operating systems were Maneuver; Fire Support; Intelligence; Mobility and Survivability; Air Defense; Combat Service Support; as well as Command and Control. The battalion and its units took those 7 operating systems; added an overall rating; a training priority; followed by a training strategy and then the result became the suggested format at Figure 11.¹⁰ The battalion also added a diagonal under each operating system to indicate day training as the top half and night training as the bottom half to indicate the unit's limited visibility training status (Figure 11).

CRITICAL TASK ASSESSMENT

TASK	STATUS							PRIORITY	STRATEGY
	MAN	FS	INT	M/ C/S	AD	CSS	C3	OVER ALL	
1A EMPLOY 2A DIRECT 3A FIRE	T	T	P	P	P	T	T	T	PLATOON BATTLE DRILLS (LFX/MILES/RANGES) MOUNTED/DISMOUNTED MANEUVER LANES
		T	P	P	P	P	T	P	
1B EMPLOY 2B SUPPORTING 3B FIRE	P	T	P	P	P	T	P	P	DIV CPX/ TOCEX PLATOON BATTLE DRILLS (LFX/MILES) TSFO
		T	P	P	P	T	P	P	
1C CONDUCT 2C FIRE AND MANEUVER	T	T	P	P	P	T	T	T	PLATOON BATTLE DRILLS (LFX/MILES) CONDUCT IF/TM DECONTAMINATION
		T	P	P	P	T	T	T	
2D TAKE ACTION ON CONTACT/ HASTY ATTACK	P	T	P	P	P	T	P	P	PLATOON BATTLE DRILLS (LFX/MILES) MOUNTED/DISMOUNTED MANEUVER LANES
		T	P	P	P	T	P	P	
1D BREACH/BYPASS MINEFIELD/ OBSTACLE	T	T	P	P	P	T	P	P	PLATOON BATTLE DRILLS (LFX/MILES) CONDUCT OPERATOR/ ORGANIZATIONAL MAINT
		T	P	P	P	T	P	P	

T=TRAINED P=NEEDS PRACTICE U=UNTRAINED ?=UNKNOWN DAY/LIMITED VISIBILITY
 LETTER/NUMBER ACCORDING TO METL. I.E.. TASK 1.A. IS FIRST PRIORITY CRITICAL TASK EVALUATED FOR
 METL #1

Evaluation of proficiency under the 7 operating systems existed in the format of T=trained, P=needs practice, U=untrained and ?=unknown. An example of Critical Task Assessment Format (Figure 11) follows: ATTACK was the battalion's first priority MET (Figure 4) and EMPLOY DIRECT FIRE was identified as the highest priority critical task. Thus EMPLOY DIRECT FIRE was reflected as 1A under the TASK column (Figure 11). ATTACK, which was the battalion's highest priority MET, had for its second most critical task EMPLOY SUPPORTING FIRE, and was indicated as 1B under the TASK column. The METs priorities from the battalion's METL were listed in order of; first ATTACK; second MOVEMENT TO CONTACT; third DEFEND and so forth (Figure 4). MET priorities within the battalion's METL were noted by numbers and critical tasks priority by letters.

The Critical Task Assessment format (Figure 11) was designed to indicate the battalion METs and critical task assessment of each MET; how well the unit was trained by the 7 operating systems; battalion training priority and finally the strategy intended to correct training shortcomings and/or maintain the accepted level of proficiency. However, one of the most critical phases was yet to be developed. Specifically, how well was the unit trained? What was a T, P, U or ? in reality?

TRAINING EVALUATION FORMULA

It was relatively easy to subjectively determine how well you were trained, but an objective standard was needed and developed. The battalion's approach was, if an objective not

subjective standard was sought follows: That the battalion's platoons (Battalion Battle Tasks) had negotiated a platoon training event, that the Company Commanders developed to support the METL, and had been evaluated as 80% of the platoons were a "T" with not greater than 20% of the battalion platoons as a "P" and 0% at a "U" or "?"; this equated to an overall "T" status. Example of a type formula is at Figure 12. The key to this training evaluation formula was it developed an objective standard to evaluate the battalion's ability to accomplish a task rather than a subjective measurement.

TRAINING EVALUATION FORMULA

- Not less than 80% T + not more than 20% P + 0% at U or ? = "T"
- Not less than 80% T or P + not greater than 20% U or ? = "P"
- Greater than 20% U or ? = "U"
- ? self explanatory = "?"

24 platoons counting staff, medical, support, etc. in an Inf. Bn.

20 platoons at T + 4 platoons at P = "T"

20 platoons at T + 2 platoons at P + 2 platoons ? = "P "

14 platoons at T + 2 platoons at P + 6 platoons U
+ 2 platoons ? = "U"

T = Trained

P = Needs Practice

U = Untrained

? = Unknown

FIGURE 12

ESTABLISHING THE STANDARD

But what was the standard? Training objectives always consisted of tasks, conditions and standards. These training objectives were outcome oriented and were designed to hold unit leadership accountable for their units' training development. But once the critical task and conditions were established in which the units are going to operate, then the hard part, establish a tough, demanding yet realistic standard. Standards were expected to be demanding. If a battalion's leadership allowed less than demanding training standards it was in fact condemning soldiers to die unnecessarily on a battlefield. Leaders learned how to fight, but even more important they were trained to be able to train others to fight.

An excellent start, but now the effort was to focus on achieving training to a demanding standard. "If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there." The comment was stated by the author's Division Commander as he pointed out to his battalion commanders that in training units it is critical to not only know what it is you want to develop, but also what will be the final outcome of the training. Then and only then can you begin the development of specific training objectives. Never start with a scenario; begin with training objectives based on your METL. Then insure that you have a specific product or outcome that is to be developed identified. From training objectives scenarios could be developed. The focus was and was always the METL.

The battalion approached how does the training get

conducted to the standard necessary to ensure the accomplishment of the METL in a very specific format. Step one was: what was the mission or terminal training objective (TTO)? The TTO (or mission) represented what the unit was to accomplish, for example, a platoon movement to contact. Clearly the TTO (Platoon Movement to Contact) was broken down to a Task, Condition and Standard (Figure 13).

TTO:	PLATOON MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
TASK:	CONDUCT PLATOON MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
CONDITION:	GIVEN AN INFANTRY PLATOON WITH MTOE EQUIPMENT, A COMPANY OPORD AND A PLATOON SIZED ENEMY IN THE ASSIGNED ZONE OF ATTACK. (NBC COULD BE ADDED IF DESIRED AS A CONDITION.)
STANDARDS:	INITIATE THE ATTACK AT THE DESIGNATED TIME. GAIN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY WITHOUT BEING DETECTED. DESTROY AT LEAST 75% OF THE ENEMY AND/OR FORCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ENEMY ENCOUNTERED IN THE ATTACK. NOT HAVE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES INFLICTED GREATER THAN 10%.

FIGURE 13

TRAINING OBJECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS

The TTO with a task, condition and standard, was identified. Now what were those critical tasks that were necessary to support the TTO? Those critical tasks necessary to support the TTO were called Intermediate Training Objectives (ITOs). ITOs and each ITO that was designed to support the TTO would be evaluated via situational training exercises (STXs), drills and individual proficiency (IPs) (Figure 14).¹¹




FIGURE 14

STXs were situations that were presented in such a manner as to require the leadership of the unit being trained to apply METT-T to arrive at a decision. This METT-T means mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops and time available. However, the critical issue here was the STX was designed in such a manner as to have the soldier/leader develop his decision making and problem solving skills. It was not a STX if the leader was told what to do then execute the event. No problem solving or decision making had taken place. Drills were evaluated from the perspective of an automatic life saving response, such as putting on a protective mask or hitting the ground and rolling to one side or the other. A TTD, with ITOs, designed to support the TTD and STXs/Drills/IPs necessary to support the ITOs and TTD are at Figure 14. This graphic representation (Figure 14) depicted the relationships of the IPs, Drills, STXs, ITOs and TTD to each other.

To refine this approach, an asterisk was placed by the specific tasks the leadership of the unit conducting the training desired to focus their attention during a training period. A separate page was prepared (Figure 15) displaying a breakout under TTD, ITOs, STXs, Drills, and IPs a listing of training events. This was helpful in rapidly reviewing all the ITOs, STXs, Drills and IPs available for this particular training event. Once again an asterisk noted the specific focus of the unit leadership for that training event.

TTO: CONDUCT PLATOON MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

IIOs:	STXs:	DRILLS:	IPs:
PREPARE FOR OPERATIONS	PLAN DIRECT FIRES	REACT TO NBC ATTACK	REPORT PERSONNEL
MANEUVER	PLAN INDIRECT FIRES	LOAD, REDUCE STOPPAGE	STATUS
CONDUCT HASTY ATTACK	DEVELOP SITUATION	AND CLEAR WEAPON	TREAT CAUSALITIES
SUSTAIN COMBAT OPERATIONS	CONSOLIDATE	ENGAGE ENEMY WITH M16A1	EMPLOY INDIVIDUAL
	REORGANIZE	RIFLE	DIRECT FIRES
	CONDUCT TACTICAL	EXCHANGE MAGAZINES	USE APPROPRIATE
	MOVEMENT		INDIVIDUAL MOVEMENT
	CONDUCT TACTICAL		CAMOUFLAGE SELF AND
	RESUPPLY		EQUIPMENT
	MAINTAIN LOCAL SECURITY/		SALUTE
	OVERWATCH		MOVE AS A MEMBER OF
	CONDUCT TACTICAL MOVEMENT		A FIRE TEAM
	CROSS LD		PUT ON PROTECTIVE
	TREAT AND EVAC CAUSALITIES		MASK
	TAKE ACTION ON CONTACT		EXCHANGE MAGAZINES
	EMPLOY DIRECT FIRE		REPORT VEHICLE
	EMPLOY INDIRECT FIRE		STATUS
	CONDUCT LEADERS RECON		PERFORM OPERATOR
	CONDUCT PERSONNEL		MAINT
	RECONSTITUTION		
	CONDUCT VEHICLE/EQUIP		
	RECONSTITUTION		

FIGURE 15


MULTI-ECHELON TRAINING

A training task list thus was developed showing supporting relationships and formatted through the use of a TTD, ITDs, STXs, Drills and IPs (Figures 14 & 15). However, the focus of all the battalion's training could not be on a single training event, you had to conduct multi-echelon level training. This was when two or more levels of training were conducted concurrently. For instance, on a platoon movement to contact the company commander was training the platoon leader at the platoon level by requiring him to maneuver his platoon, but company level training was being conducted because he required the platoon leaders to render situation reports as required per the company standing operating procedures. The squad leaders were being trained as they were required to not only maneuver their squads, but also coordinate that movement with other squad leaders and the platoon leader. Finally, the individual soldier was being trained through the use of drills and individual proficiencies via **Prepare For Operations** checks prior to moving out for the operation as well as his individual responses to the various STXs and Drills. Thus, in this one training exercise the company commander, platoon leader, squad leaders and soldiers were being trained at the same time. The battalion commander also had the battalion executive officer meet in a separate area with company executive officers and First Sergeants to cover the ITD of Sustain Combat Operations (Figure 14). This training of company executive officers and First Sergeants had STXs requiring tactical resupply, personnel

reconstitution, personnel situation reporting, placement of themselves during a battle to be able to take charge if their immediate commander is killed, to name just a few. Finally the battalion commander met with his brigade commander to discuss a brigade/battalion defense and offensive operation on a piece of terrain selected by the brigade commander. Several levels were being trained concurrently, thus multi-echelon level training.

FREQUENCY OF TRAINING

How often does a unit need to accomplish the tasks identified in its METL? How often should the various leaders repeat a particular training event in order to maintain proficiency? "Sustainment training is based on the need to maintain an acceptable level of performance across-the-board everyday of the year rather than peaking once or twice a year for a given event. In this way the force remains constantly ready to fight or deploy without protracting preparation."¹² The units must maintain themselves within a band of excellence (Figure 16).¹³ Thus the battalion's Battle Focus had to be on sustainment of training in order to maintain our capability to remain within the band of excellence which equated to being prepared to go to war on any day.



Remaining in the band of excellence became a function of being especially sensitive to the needs to link individual proficiency, leader and collective training together to maintain combat readiness rather than to peak. The only way the battalion's units maintained that proficiency was to insure the unit was at the required standard when it had completed training and that training was repeated in such a frequency as to maintain proficiency. Training was done correctly. The unit could not afford to allow improper training to occur. When the soldier completed the training, if it was not conducted to the proper standard and was wrong, then the soldier assumed the

wrong way was the correct way or even worse that the leadership of the unit did not care. Once the frequency of the training event was established in order to maintain the unit's proficiency, then the unit had answered a most difficult question. That of how often the unit had to repeat the training event to maintain proficiency and remain in the band of excellence.

An excellent manner to determine the frequency of training events necessary to support the unit's METL was to seriously apply the Training Management Model in FM 25-100. That model (Figure 17) was an ideal example of how leadership was provided the feedback necessary to maintain unit proficiency.




FIGURE 17

As feedback on the battalion's individual units' training was received, we had to insure it was positive, demanding feedback via After Action Reviews that produced more proficient units. Every time a unit trained maneuvering, we insured the opposing force (OPFOR) also had like demanding ITO, ITO's, STXs, Drills, and IPs so they could also win. In training the battalion never predetermined who would win. It was up to the leaders and men to decide who would win, and this was based on decisions leaders made during the engagement. If a platoon conducted a movement to contact it was critical to insure the OPFOR had just as much planning and preparation time to insure they were prepared for the mission to defend. Opposing force units had to have equally demanding standards. The victor developed the greater combat power and "combat power is the ability to fight" and win.¹⁴ The battalion insured its subordinate leaders covered thoroughly in After Action Reviews (AAR) the critical tasks necessary to win and how the unit performed. Always we started the AAR with what the ITO was and went through each ITO, STX, Drill and IP evaluated. The leadership was positive and had the soldiers provide the answer. We did not critique or lecture. When an AAR was conducted the unit being evaluated provided the bulk of discussion.

CONCLUSION

Within the battalion we maintained the philosophy to knowingly not properly train soldiers to demanding realistic standards in peace was considered criminal. "Training will be

the top priority for all commanders."¹⁵ Realistic, demanding, solid training for the battalion's units that was necessary to support the METL was demanded and had to be the standard not the exception. We had the philosophy of "train to the highest level possible with the resources that are available."¹⁶ We owe it to our soldiers, their families and our country. But as we all know any plan was only as good as its execution. An excellent plan that was precise to each detail and poorly executed by soldiers and leaders that lack motivation or the Warrior Spirit would fail. However a good solid plan executed with intensity and the Warrior Spirit would carry the day. Obviously, we had an obligation to our soldiers to present the best possible plan, but that "Will to Win", that "I won't let my buddy or unit down" attitude will carry the day in combat. "The battlefield is a...stressful, chaotic place...soldiers want to follow leaders whom they trust and who provide them strength inspiration and guidance."¹⁷ Take care of the soldier, show him you truly care, lead from the front, require the soldier to accomplish nothing you can not also accomplish and he will stand and fight with you in the most demanding of circumstances.

The times ahead are demanding. The battalion now, through the operationalizing of FM 25-100, understood the need for a METL, that training was to be maintained by tough realistic standards, supporting multi-echelon training by motivated soldiers and leaders with the Warrior Spirit. "The sole reason for [a leaders] existence in peacetime is to train his soldiers and units for war."¹⁸ Leadership had to be both caring and

demanding of its personnel. The units that operationalized FM 25-100 were ready because FM 25-100 provided a direct Battle Task Focus linkage from squad up to Division and how higher commanders and the battalion would fight the enemy. We owed our soldiers too much to not fully understand FM 25-100. It is the base document in which we can truly train to prepare for war. FM 25-100 provided a training orientation linkage system that was outcome oriented and expected subordinate leadership to be accountable for their actions in demanding training and standards that would win in combat. To not train our soldiers in time of peace to the demanding standards of war is criminal. The battalion became ready. We cared too much for those magnificent soldiers to not make sure their leaders, not only know how to fight, but how to train their men to fight to win and to win again and again.

RECOMMENDATIONS

During my discussions with the incoming battalion commander as I prepared to depart the unit, I emphasized FM 25-100 TRAINING THE FORCE provided the basis for "building upon the Battalion's Training Management System (BTMS) and expands the training management principle to brigade and higher commanders."¹⁹ This system had to be imbedded into the very bedrock of the U.S. Army. The philosophy of FM 25-100 could not stop at the brigade level. The foundation of the effectiveness of the U.S. Army as a whole to a large part rested with the incorporation of FM 25-100 to every leader and not just the


Colonel and above. All Noncommissioned Officer and Officer Education System Courses had to include a detailed study of FM 25-100.

This study of FM 25-100 must not only include a study of terms but application as well. Whether entering into the basic officer course or the primary leadership development course those leaders must learn to apply FM 25-100 into the very heart of training study and readiness.

An excellent example of how this process may be applied is the model used at the U.S. Army Infantry School Infantry Officer Advanced Course (Figure 18). Step one is the students are briefed and begin their study of FM 25-100. Then the officer must develop a METL for his simulated unit, obviously supporting documents such as a higher METL, ARTEP manuals, higher commander's intent are made available. Then the student assesses the training status of a simulated unit and gives a presentation addressing the application of a METL to his or a like type tactical unit.

This is followed by student presentations and the application of how does the student train to accomplish his METL. Situational training exercise development follows so he conducts a briefback on what was, and how he developed, his intended outcome, understanding of FM 25-100 etc. Next he presents his solution to practical exercises as to how he utilized FM 25-100 and its application to specific situational training exercises/practical exercises. This process is concluded with a final AAR and feedback by the faculty to the

student on the products he developed.



This academic application approach of hands on and not just a study of theory incorporated into the U.S. Army School System will in due time develop a true understanding of FM 25-100. To do any less does not, in my opinion fully incorporate the intent

of FM 25-100 i.e. that of teaching leaders to train the force
how to fight and operationalize FM 25-100 into reality.

ENDNOTES

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14. U.S. Department of the Army, OPERATIONS, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: GPO, 5 May 1986), p. 11.
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